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Court held that indigent criminal defendants have a right to counsel
at felony trials and on the first non-discretionary appeal. At the direct appeal stage of the judicial process, however, the right seems to
end: The Court to date has drawn the line at the first appeal of
right, at least in non-capital cases. The Court has not yet decided
whether death row inmates wishing to challenge their convictions
and sentences have a constitutional right to counsel in the capital
post-conviction process.
In a recent article entitled FacingDeath Alone: The Post-conviction
Counsel Crisis On Death Row, 3 this author argued that courts in postconviction must remain open to the condemned because the postconviction system reveals injustices not detected earlier in the criminal justice process. 4 As a practical matter, meaningful access requires lawyers. Denial of post-conviction lawyers is tantamount to a
denial of access to the post-conviction process to the condemned
because death penalty law and post-conviction law are extremely
subtle, nuanced, complex and rapidly changing; confinement on
death row makes impossible the factual and legal investigation essential to effective capital post-conviction litigation; the press of impending execution dates increases the difficulties inherent in pro se
capital post-conviction litigation; widespread illiteracy, retardation
and mental illness on death row conspires to make pro se representation meaningless; the increasingly stringent rules against successive post-conviction challenges means that the post-conviction
5
litigant must get it right the first time.
A counsel crisis results from the fact that the demand for lawyers on death row far outstrips the availability of lawyers willing or
able to represent condemned inmates; death row inmates thus must
face impending execution without counsel. 6 The purpose of this Article is to explore whether the phenominological reality of the need
for lawyers, described in FacingDeath Alone, lends itself to a constitutional solution. The only case to date to analyze this question, GiarS Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Counsel Crisis On Death Row, 37 AM.
U.L. REV. 513 (1988).
4 In the interest of uniform style it is the policy of the Journalof Criminal Law and
Criminology not to publish articles written in the first person. This Article was edited
accordingly over the objections of the author.
5 Mello, supra note 3, at 530-67.
6 Mello, supra note 3, at 569-85; Howe, More Texas Law Firms Needed to Represent Death
Row Inmates, TEX. BAR J. 850 (Sept. 1988); Sales, Indigent Death Row Inmates - Society's
Ultimate Sentence and the Lawyer's Ultimate Obligation, TEX. BAR J. 782 (Sept. 1988); Silas,
Death Row: A Cry ForHelp, BAR LEADER 17 (May-June 1988); Torry, Lawyers Scramble to Fill
Void in Death Row Appeals, Washington Post, June 24, 1988, at 27.
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ratano v. Murray,7 has provided inconclusive answers. Following a
brief description of the post-conviction process and a discussion of
Giarratano, this Article argues that recognition of a right to counsel
in capital post-conviction proceedings is demanded by prevailing
constitutional doctrine.
I.

INTRODUCTION: THE POST-CONVICTION PROCESS

Persons convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death
have a right to a plenary appeal to the state court of appeals.8
Counsel clearly must be provided at trial9 and on this direct appeal. 10 Beyond this point, the availability of the right to counsel is
unclear.
After direct appeal, the death row inmate is entitled to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme Court and then to seek postconviction relief in state court.1 1 The state post-conviction system
provides a procedural mechanism for raising claims which were not
or could not have been raised on the plenary direct appeal. 12 For
this reason, it is fair to characterize the state post-conviction process
as an extension of and supplement to the plenary appeal, at least as
to these issues. State post-conviction litigation may be initiated
either in the state trial court and subsequently appealed to the state
appellate court, or litigation may be initiated in the state appellate
court, depending on the type of claims raised and the requirements
of local procedure.
Following completion of state post-conviction litigation, the
condemned inmate is entitled to file a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court,' 3 the denial of which may, in most
cases, be appealed to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals. At least since Brown v. Allen, 14 the controversial' 5 Great Writ
7 668 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988) aft'd, 847
F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
8 See generally D. PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1982); Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. LJ. 97 (1979); Skene, Review of Capital
Cases: Does the FloridaSupreme Court Know What It's Doing?, 15 STETSON L. REV. 263 (1986).
9 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
11 See generally Wright & Miller, In Your Court, 18 URB. L. 659 (1983).
12 See, e.g., Atkinson v. United States, 366 A.2d 450, 452-53 (D.C. 1976); McCrae v.
State, 437 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 1983).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
14 344 U.S. 443 (1953).

15 For a sampling of the academic debate, see, e.g., Allen, Schachtman & Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and Its Reform: An Empirical Analysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 675-76
(1982); Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw andFederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV.
L. REV. 441 (1961); Brennan, FederalHabeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Feder-
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of habeas corpus permits relitigation of federal constitutional claims
16
which have been presented previously to the state courts.
Of the almost two thousand people who presently live under
sentence of death in thirty-three states,' 7 more than five hundred
are in the post-conviction process already, and many others will be
there soon.t 8 Most of these inmates are indigent and cannot afford
alism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961); Doub, The Case Against Modern Habeas Corpus, 57 A.B.A.
J. 323 (1971); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142 (1970); Mitchell,
"Restoring the Finality ofJustice, 55 JUDICATURE 203 (1971); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1105 91977); O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federaland
State Courtsfrom the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 802
(1981); Olsen,JudicialProposalsto Limit theJurisdictionalScope of FederalHabeas Post-Conviction Claims of State Prisoners, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 301 (1982); Peller, In Defense of Habeas
Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579 (1982); Pollack, Proposals to Curtail
Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: CollateralAttack on the Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50,
64 (1956); Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA.
L. REV. 461 (1960); Reynoldson, Iowa's ChiefJustice Discusses State-FederalJudicialRelations,
6 ST. CT. J. issue 3, p. 24 (1982); Robbins, The Habeas Corpus Certificate of Probable Cause,
44 OHIo ST. L.J. 307, 311 (1983); Robbins & Sanders,JudicialIntegrity, the Appearance of
Justice and the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus : How to Kill Two Thirds (Or More) With One Stone,
15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63, 66 (1977); Rosenberg, Constricting FederalHabeas Corpus: From
Great Writ to ExceptionalRemedy, 12 HASTINGS CON. L.O. 597 (1985); Rosenberg,Jettisoning
Fay v. Noia: ProceduralDefault By Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L.REV. 341
(1978); Rosenn, The Great Writ--A Reflection of Social Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 269 (1983);
Smith, New "'Federalism" Proposals Outlined by Smith, 6 ST. CT. J. issue 3, p. 25 (1982);
Soloff, Litigation and Relitigation: The Uncertain Status of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297 (1978); Tague, FederalHabeas Corpus and Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1978); Yackle, The Reagan Administration's Habeas Corpus Proposals, 68 IowA L.REV. 609, 610 (1983); Note, Proposed Modfications of FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners-Reformor Revocation?, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1221 (1973); Symposium: State Use of FederalHabeas Corpus Procedures, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
337 (1983); Comment, Lundy, Isaac & Frady: A Tiilogy of Habeas Corpus Restraint, 32
CATH. U.L. REV. 169, 169-70 (1982).
16 At some point between direct appeal and execution, the condemned inmate may
seek executive clemency. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1977).
17 As of August 1 1987, a total of 1,911 prisoners were under sentences of death in
33 states. NAACP, Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. (Aug.
1, 1987)(unpublished compilation). This is the highest figure ever recorded in the
United States. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: THE DEATH PEN-

ALTY 3 (1987). These figures will continue to grow, even if executions resume at a frequent rate. Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 929-36
(Appendix) (1982) (tracking additions to and deletions from death row between 1976
and 1981). The population awaiting execution is showing a net increase of five per
week. Death Day, Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1987 at A22.
18 As of the summer of 1987, at least 487 capital cases were in state post-conviction
or federal habeas corpus processes; these figures do not include Texas, Arizona or Virginia, three states with substantial death row populations. See 1987 Airlie Status Report
1 (unpublished compilation). Texas has 248 people on death row; Arizona has 64; Virginia has 33. Death Row, US.A., supra, note 17.
In 1983, the Supreme Court noted that "it is a matter of public record that an increasing number of death sentenced petitioners are entering the appellate stages of the
federal habeas process." Barefool v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). See also Brief for
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (amicus curiae), at 35, Barefoot v. Estelle,
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to hire lawyers. 19 The American Bar Association has estimated that
of death row prisoners are paupers: "these prisoners, many
of whom cannot read or write, are left to their own devices. They
end up filing pathetic motions that can't be taken seriously."' 2 ' Yet,
with few exceptions, 2 2 the vast majority of capital states make no
formal provision for counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings.
These states include Texas, Georgia, Alabama and Virginia. Until
October 1985, they also included Florida.
99%20

II.

GIARRATANO V. MURRAY

In Giarratanov. Murray,23 a federal district court, on an extensive factual record, held that Virginia death row inmates have a constitutional right to attorney assistance in state post-conviction
litigation 2 4 -but not in federal habeas corpus proceedings. This
holding was based on the right of access to courts articulated in
Bounds v. Smith. 25 The Commonwealth appealed the district court's
decision in Giarratano,and a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 26 The en banc Fourth Circuit vacated the panel
opinion, heard supplemental oral argument, and affirmed the district court. 2 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 28 Regardless
of the ultimate outcome in Giarratano,the district court and court of
appeals opinions require examination.
The Giarratanolitigation has its genesis in the counsel crisis described in FacingDeath Alone. 2 9 Virginia's death row depended on
463 U.S. 880 (1983)("[a]pproximately 60 [capital] cases have already reached the federal courts of appeal, and roughly 100 more are pending in the federal district courts.").
As of April 21, 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had
decided the cases of 40 Florida condemned inmates and of 66 Georgia and Alabama
inmates. See Computer Printout Prepared by Craig S. Barnard, Chief Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, Florida (April 21, 1988).
19 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 189 (1982).
20 Death Row Inmates Can't Find Lawyers, 73 A.B.A.J. 58 (Jan. 1, 1987).
21 Id. at 58 (quoting Steven Raiken, Staff Director, ABA Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities). See also Hooks v. Wainwright, 536 F. Supp. 1330, 1366 (M.D. Fla.
1982), rev'd on other grounds, 775 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985) (95% of prisoners are
indigent).
22 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 27.702 (1988) (legislation creating Office of the Capital Collateral Representative of the State of Florida). See generally Mello, supra note 3 at 567-606.
23 668 F.2d 511 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev'd, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 847 F.2d
1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 303 (1988).
24 Accord Carey v. Garrison, 403 F. Supp. 395 (W.D.N.C..1975).
25 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
26 Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 14RI (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd 847 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc), cert. granted,'109 S.Ct. 303 (1988).
27 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
28 109 S.CCt. 303 (1988).
29 See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
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volunteer, pro bono counsel, and the pool of volunteers was running dry. One volunteer attorney described the situation in Virginia
as of mid-1986 in this way: "In Virginia, there is not even a manual,
brief bank or a single staff attorney able to provide guidance for
anyone who does volunteer. There is merely one coordinator, who
is not an attorney and who has barely been able to muddle through
30
on extremely meager resources."
Joseph Giarratano, a Virginia death row inmate, filed in federal
district court a pro se civil rights class action complaint 3 t seeking appointment of counsel for post-conviction proceedings. Eventually, a
large law firm was appointed as counsel for Giarratano as representative of a class of unrepresented Virginia death row inmates who
wished to pursue post-conviction remedies.
Federal DistrictJudge Robert Mehrige in Giarratanoheld that as
to the class of unrepresented Virginia death row inmates, meaningful access to the courts in state post-conviction proceedings requires
lawyers for the condemned.3 2 "[O]nly the continuous services of an
attorney to investigate, research, and present claimed violations of
fundamental rights provides them [condemned prisoners] the
meaningful access to the courts guaranteed by the Constitution."3 3
The district court in Giarratanobased its holding on the meaningful access to courts rationale advanced in Bounds v. Smith.3 4
Bounds requires states to provide either trained legal assistance or
adequate law libraries to prisoners wishing to pursue post-conviction remedies. 3 5 Judge Mehrige read Bounds to mean that, in general, inmates are capable of using a law library. 3 6 This assumption
accounted "for the alternative nature of the required relief: trained
legal assistance or adequate law libraries." 37 Judge Mehrige found
that the underlying assumption in Bounds, that inmates are capable
of using law libraries, was invalid as applied to death row inmates.
Three considerations provided the basis for this determination.
First, death row inmates have a limited amount of time to prepare and present petitions to the courts. 38 The "result is that a
30 Tabak, The Death of Fairness, 7 DEFENDER 36, 40 (1986).
31 The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
32 The judge also held that there is not a right to counsel in federal post-conviction
proceedings. 668 F. Supp. at 516-17.
33 668 F. Supp. at 513.
34 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
35 Id. at 826.
36 Id.
37 668 F. Supp. at 513.
38 Under VA. CODE ANN. § 17-110.1 (1987) an execution can be carried out at any
time as long as thirty days have elapsed since the date of conviction.
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large amount of legal work must be compressed into a limited
amount of time." 39 Second, the legal work involved is difficult and
complex. A pro se petitioner would have to spend large blocks of
time analyzing transcripts from the guilt determination phase, as
well as dealing with mitigation and aggravation issues characteristic
of the sentencing phase of a capital case. 40 Third, "an inmate preparing himself and his family for death is incapable of performing
41
the mental functions necessary to adequately puruse his claims."
At the time when it is most critical that a condemned prisoner's
mental faculties and legal attention be particularly acute, the imminent approach of death distracts.
The district judge also examined the legal assistance program
in effect in Virgiinia and found, at least as far as those on death row
were concerned, that it failed to pass muster under the Bounds standard. His conclusion on the evidence was that seven part-time lawyers, handling the legal questions of more than 2,000 non-capital
prisoners, could not and did not meet the needs of death row inmates seeking post-conviction relief.4 2 These lawyers did not conduct factual investigation, sign pleadings or appear in court. Their
43
role was advisory.
Going a step further, the judge ruled that even if the Commonwealth hired additional attorneys for the prisoner assistance program, its duty under Bounds would not be fulfilled. Death row
inmates needed more than "talking law books" 4 4 that do no factual
investigation, do not sign pleadings, and do not make court
45
appearances.
Virginia assigns counsel to inmates who, on their own, are ini668 F. Supp. at 513.
Id.
Id.
42 Judge Mehrige recognized that there was authority for holding that the Virginia
system did comply with Bounds for the needs of the general prison population. Williams
v. Leeke, 584 F.2d 1336, 1339 (4th Cir. 1978). However, in the case of death row inmates, the judge found deficiencies, noting that the appointed attorneys were not fulltime and could, at best, handle only a single capital case at a time. Indeed, there was
testimony at trial from one of the court appointed institutional attorneys describing a
three month period during which he and the other appointed attorneys were too
"burned out" to even visit the prison and attend to the legal needs of the regular prisoners. Trial Transcript at 224, Giarratano v. Murray, No. 85-0655R (E.D. Va. 1986).
43 As to the court appointed institutional attorneys, of those who actually met with
inmates the average time spent per prisoner was almost always less than an hour. Transcript, supra note 42, at 224-227. Additionally these visits were quite sporadic. The
attorneys have no regularly scheduled visits and simply wait for the prisoner requests to
pile up. Id.
44 Transcript, supra note 42, at 224.
45 668 F. Supp. at 515.
39
40
41
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tially able to file a nonfrivolous petition. 46 However, Judge Mehrige
found that the creation of the petition must be deemed a "critical
stage" in the capital litigation process. 47 Therefore, "the timing of
the appointment is a fatal defect with respect to the requirements of
Bounds." 4 8 Judge Mehrige held that the continuous assistance of
counsel was necessary in the development of a condemned prisoner's claim. 49 Post-petition assistance is simply too "untimely,"
while "the pre-petition assistance provided by institutional attor50
neys is too limited."
The district court's discussion in Giarratanothen turned to the
counsel crisis on Virginia's death row. The judge noted that while
in the past the Commonwealth did not need to worry about representation for inmates facing execution, today the situation is entirely
different. "The evidence conclusively establishes that... few-very
few-attorneys are willing to voluntarily represent death row inmates in post-conviction efforts."'' S The "stakes are simply too high
52
for this Court not to grant, at least in part, some relief."
Before moving into an explanation of the scope of the postconviction right to counsel for the condemned, Judge Mehrige performed what can best be described as a due process analysis,
although he did not characterize it as such. Nevertheless, it is outlined in Matthews v. Eldridge53 and has recently been applied in the
capital context in Ake v. Oklahoma.54 Using the Matthews/Ake test, a
court balances the value to be gained by the state and by the individual, through the recognition of the right against the risk of error
absent the procedural protection at issue.
Judge Mehrige did not view the monetary cost to the Commonwealth as significant. Virginia already appointed attorneys for inmates who were able to file non-frivolous claims on their own. The
46 VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (1986). See also Cooper v. Haas, 210 Va. 279, 170
S.E.2d 5 (1969); Darnell v. Peyton, 208 Va. 675, 160 S.E.2d 749 (1968).
47 668 F. Supp. at 513. This assertion was supported by testimony given at trial,
during which one witness, an attorney with extensive experience as a capital post-conviction litigator, opined that "[t]he state post-conviction document is the most critical document in the capital litigation." Transcript, supra note 42, at 17.
48 668 F. Supp. at 515.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. See also Transcript, supra note 42, at 190-210 (discussion on the difficulty of
finding counsel for the condemned). The court found that the amount of time that
death cases consume and the emotional drain associated with defending them are major
barriers to the acquisition of counsel. 668 F. Supp. at 515. See also Transcript, supra note
42, at 31, 59.
52 668 F. Supp. at 515.
53 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
54 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
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incremental difference in cost associated with providing counsel to
the indigent on death row "should not impose an onerous burden
on the Commonwealth. '5 5 This view can be juxtaposed with the
judge's earlier comments on the risk of error absent the provision of
counsel to death row inmates:
The matter of a death row inmate's habeas corpus petition is too
important-both to society, which has a compelling interest in insuring that a sentence of death has been constitutionally imposed, as well
as to the individuals involved-to leave to what is at best, a patchwork
system of assistance.5 6
After deciding that condemned Virginia prisoners must have a
remedy of counsel to effectuate the right of meaningful access to the
courts in the pursuit of state post-conviction remedies, the judge
narrowed the scope of relief by drawing a line at federal habeas
corpus proceedings. The Supreme Court's decision in Ross v. Moffitt 57 was the exclusive support for this conclusion. The Supreme
Court in Moffitt had refused to find a right to counsel in proceedings
58
seeking discretionary review beyond the first appeal as of right.
Three factors from Moffitt weighed in the Giarratano district
court's decision. First, the Giarratanocourt maintained that "[p]art
of Moffitt's rationale was that a court addressing a discretionary review petition is not primarily concerned with the correctness of the
judgment below, but rather the jurisprudential importance of the
issues involved." 5 9 Second, Judge Mehrige agreed with the holding
of Moffitt that "it would be anomolous to require a state to provide
counsel to one seeking federal statutorily created relief ' 60 (certiorari in Moffitt and habeas in Giarratano). Third, in light of the requirement that habeas petitioners must exhaust state remedies prior
to filing a habeas petition in federal court, 6 ' if states provide counsel
in their own post-conviction proceedings there will be transcripts,
appellate briefs, court opinions and other documentation available.
to aid the federal courts in their decisions by the time the case
62
reaches the federal habeas stage of post-conviction.
A Fourth Circuit panel unanimously affirmed the district court's
denial of appointed counsel for death row inmates wishing to pre55 668 F. Supp. at 515.
56 Id.

57 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
58 Id. at 610.

59 668 F. Supp. at 516.
60 Id.

61 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).
62 Giarratano,688 F. Supp. at 517.
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pare federal habeas corpus proceedings. 63 The panel majority,
however, reversed the district court's order requiring Virginia to appoint attorneys for death row inmates pursuing state post-conviction remedies. 64 Judge Wilkins, writing for the majority, found that,
based on the evidence before the district court, the district court's
determination that the Commonwealth was not meeting its Bounds
obligation was clearly erroneous. 6 5 Moreover, the panel majority
found the district court had abused its discretion in ordering a rem66
edy as extreme as appointment of counsel.
The majority based its conclusion on primarily three grounds:
(1) the district court's fact-finding was clearly erroneous; (2) after
the district court decided Giarratano, the Supreme Court held in
Pennsylvania v. Finley 67 that there is no constitutional right to counsel
in non-capital state post-conviction proceedings; 6 8 and, (3) the
unique nature of death as a punishment does not justify an excep69
tion to Bounds v. Smith or Pennsylvania v. Finley.
After its examination of the evidence before the district court,
the panel majority held that the prevailing legal assistance program
that Virginia provided death row inmates satisfied the Bounds meaningful access requirement. The court noted that inmates were furnished upon request with copies of transcripts, briefs, and state
court opinions from the plenary direct appeal. 70 The majority
pointed to testimony from Giarratano's own witnesses to prove that
these materials in fact assisted inmates in the preparation of their
post-conviction petitions. 7 ' The majority also found the prison library facilities more than adequate to meet the needs of all inmates. 7 2 To support this conclusion, the majority noted thatJoseph
Giarratano had himself been successful in two previous pro se actions. 73 As the dissent by Judge Hall pointed out, the majority failed
to distinguish between the complexity of a capital post-conviction
petition and the relative simplicity of the pro se civil rights petitions
63 Id.
64 Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 846 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir.
1988) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 303 (1988).
65 Id. at 1423.
66 Id. The court characterized the district court's reading of the record to support a
"sweeping extension" of Bounds as a guise to establish a right of counsel where none is
required by the Constitution. Id.
67 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987).
68 836 F.2d at 1423-24.
69 Id. at 1425-27.

70
71
72
73

Id. at 1423.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prepared by Giarratano.7 4 The majority also failed to recognize that
Joseph Giarratano is not a typical Virginia death row inmate. 75
The majority intimated that the law library alone would suffice
to fulfill the requirements of Bounds.76 Even if the law library alone
were not sufficient, the court found that the availability of part-time
*institutional attorneys satisfied the second prong of the Bounds obli77
gation-the provision of legal assistance.
To support its conclusion that there exists no constitutional
right to counsel for discretionary proceedings, the majority relied
upon Pennsylvania v. Finley.78 The dissent, however, found the majority's reliance on Finley misplaced because Finley was not a meaningful access case, nor did it address the scope of the rule
enunciated in Bounds. 79 Most significantly, the dissent pointed out,
Finley was not a death penalty case.8 0
The majority considered whether the nature of the death penalty might constitute an exception to Finley orjustify an "exceptional
application" of Bounds.8 ' The record did not establish the existence
of complexity unique to death penalty legal issues. 8 2 In addition,
the court found the evidence did not support the district court's
findings that death row inmates labor under exceptional emotional
pressure and under severe time constraints in preparing their post83
conviction petitions.
In contrast, the dissent argued that the death penalty is unique
and that both society and the condemned prisoner have a compel84
ling interest in insuring that it has been constitutionally imposed.
Also, the dissent argued that the complexity and difficulty of legal
work involved in challenging a death sentence requires "particular
safeguards" in order to assure meaningful access to the courts.8 5
The panel majority's opinion in Giarrantanowas vacated when
the full Fourth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. Upon rehearing, the en banc Fourth Circuit rejected the panel's reasoning
Id. at 1430 (Hall, J., dissenting).
Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1423.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1423-24.
79 Id. at 1430 (Hall, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 1426.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1430 (Hall, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
85 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
74
75
76
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and affirmed the district court by a majority of six to four. 86 Judge
Hall's panel dissent essentially became the opinion of the en banc
court. Judge Wilkins' panel majority opinion became the principal
en banc dissent.
The en banc majority held that the district court's findiings
were not clearly erroneous, and upheld both its judgment and remedy. The en banc court reiterated the three factors that Judge Merhige had deemed critical to the conclusion that the degree of legal
assistance afforded death row inmates failed to satisfy Bounds' constitutional requirement of meaningful access. 8 7 Given the time constraints, the complexity of post-conviction litigation, and the
emotional instability of the inmate facing impending death, death
row inmates are incapable of effectively raising their post-conviction
claims. The majority further recognized that the appointment of an
attorney after an inmate successfully filed a petition raising a non88
frivolous claim suffered from a "fatal defect" in timing.
The en banc majority rejected the Commonwealth's reliance on
Pennsylvania v. Finley for its contention that death-sentenced prisoners are not entitled to state-supplied attorneys in post-conviction
proceedings. The majority stressed, as had the earlier panel dissent,
that Finley was not a meaningful access case. Finley did not address
the access rule set forth in Bounds. Most importatntly, Finley was not
a capital case. Citing the Supreme Court's view that matters effecting an already condemned inmate require "no less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital
proceeding, 8 9 the majority held Finley inapplicable. 90
Finally, the en banc court upheld the district court's judgment
that death row inmates are not entitled to state-appointed counsel
forfederal habeas corpus proceedings and certiorari petitions. 91 The
majority agreed with the district court's application of Ross v. Moffitt,
emphasizing that counsel-assisted state post-conviction proceedings
would generate briefs, transcripts and opinions for an inmate's use
92
in federal proceedings.
86 Giarrantano v. Murray, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. granted,*109

S. Ct. 303 (1988).
87 Id. at 1120-21.

88 Id. at 1120.

89 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411-12 (1986).
90 847 F.2d at 1122.
91 Id. at 1122.
92 Id. at 1121-22. The majority failed to explain how the death row inmate, encumbered by the same factors that would render self-help in state post-conviction proceedings ineffective, would be able to competently produce federal court pleadings and
briefs.
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Judge Wilkins, dissenting, reiterated the view expressed in his
panel majority opinion that the district court "clearly erred" in concluding that Virginia had failed to meet its constitutional obligations
under Bounds. The Commonwealth's provision of law libraries,
assistance of institutional attorneys, and supply of transcripts, and
documents from initial automatic appeals all demonstrated, according to Wilkins, that meaningful access was achieved. Further, Wilkins stated that Finley was clear in its statement that there is no
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks. 93
In the view of Wilkins, the notion that the death penalty requires
heightened procedural safeguards should have no bearing on any
expansion of constitutional rights to include assistance of counsel in
post-conviction proceedings; the differences are significant only at
the trial and sentencing stages. 9 4 Finally, Judge Wilkins disputed
the factual base supporting the district court's premise for extending Bounds to require actual assistance of counsel. The record,
Wilkins concluded, provided no support for the conclusion that an
inmate would be hindered by his emotional state, time constraints,
95
or any unusual complexity of capital post-conviction proceedings.
Judge Wilkinson's dissent echoed Wilkins' belief that no authority exists for a constitutional entitlement to post-conviction representation. Wilkinson stressed that once the direct appeal process
is completed, "a presumption of legality and finality attaches to the
conviction and sentence."' 9 6 The Constitution, he argued, required
no more. Finally, Wilkinson expressed his concern over the intrusion of federal courts into the domain of state courts and legislatures. Wilkinson reasoned that "state post-conviction remedies will
now move one step closer to the status of a federal protectorate....
If every state initiative is to involve yet another blanket of federal
administrative oversight, the capacity and incentives for the states to
' '97
undertake meaningful reforms will disappear.
Judge Widener's dissent expressed doubt that the death row inmates in Giarratanohad standing as plaintiffs, because each had the
assistance of appointed attorneys "upon request." 9 8 He also questioned the consistency of the majority's finding that an inmate is entitled to counsel in state, but not federal, post-conviction
proceedings.
Id. at
Id. at
95 Id. at
96 Id. at
97 Id. at
98 Id. at
93
94

1126-27.
1128 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
1129 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
1124 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
1125 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
1123 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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The three Giarratanoopinions form a starting point for inquiry
into the doctrinal complexities of the counsel question. The remainder of the Article will explore these complexities.
III.

DOCTRINE:

A

DISCRETE RIGHT OR

A

"COMPLEX"

RIGHT?

A right to counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings could
find its source in a discrete constitutional doctrine. It could be
predicated on: the sixth amendment's guarantee of the right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions; the fourteenth amendment's explicit guarantees of due process and equal protection, or its implicit
guarantee of meaningful access to courts; or the eighth amendment's guarantee of heightened reliability in capital cases. Any one
of these doctrines could fairly support a requirement of counsel in
the capital post-conviction system.
On the other hand, the right to counsel at all stages of a capital
case may be analyzed as an unrecognized right which can be inferred or constructed from rights which are already clearly established. It would be a "complex" right in the sense that it would be
an aggregate of rights recognized in current law, none of which,
taken by itself, may compel a right to counsel in capital post-conviction litigation. 9 9
The need to develop federal constitutional law through habeas
(using habeas as a form of federalist dialogue) is a powerful reason
for making certain that it works well and produces good law. That
value will be lost unless lawyers are available to inform the process.
As a matter of procedural law and constitutional guarantee, the necessity of counsel in the post-conviction system could be viewed as a
requirement for the meaningful operation of habeas corpus, especially as the law of habeas has developed over the last decade into an
increasingly complex body of law. Further, a responsible jurisprudence could fairly infer a right to counsel in the post-conviction system from the doctrinal conjunction of Gideon v. Wainwright, the
access to court cases' 0 0 , and the post-Furman cases which stress the
unique status of death as a punishment.1 0 '
In a series of non-capital cases, the most recent being Pennsylvania v. Finley, 10 2 the Supreme Court has held that there is no
right to counsel beyond the first non-discretionary appeal. The
cases holding this are non-capital cases which the Court could and
99 This is in the primitive "found law" sense of somnambulistic judicial
See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
100 See infra notes 217-41 and accompanying text.

101 See infra notes 242-56 and accompanying text.
102

107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987); see also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1975).

compulsion.
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must distinguish if it is to preserve judicial respectability in its death
penalty jurisprudence. As will be shown below, current limitations
on the right of counsel are arbitrary. The Court is not trapped by
cases outside the capital context unless it elects to be.
The following sections are intended to suggest a basis for recognizing this vital right from a jurisprudential standpoint. They will
also show where there is some play in the joints of an increasingly
arthritic criminal law. It should be kept in mind that this is not a
neat, abstract manipulation of case law. The niceties of doctrine allow the amalgamation of a "complex" right to counsel out of materials already at hand. The human evidence presented in FacingDeath
Alone compels it.
IV.

THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE POST-CONVICTION SYSTEM

The first element justifying the right to counsel in the capital
post-conviction system is the need for lawyers to assure the effective
operation of the post-conviction system itself. Meaningful access to
the capital post-conviction process is necessary to expose injustices
that otherwise escape detection in the judicial process, at least in
capital cases. l0 3 Meaningful access to the capital post-conviction
system is also essential as a matter of theory.
As Cover and Aleinikoff have persuasively argued, 0 4 the
habeas system operates as a federalist dialectic-it is the focus of an
on-going dialogue between the state and federal court systems
which contributes to the fine-tuning of post-conviction law. The
habeas system brings the more "pragmatic" state courts into a dialogue with the more "utopian" federal judiciary.' 0 5 The habeas
literature, and a few recent Supreme Court opinions, tend to interpret federal habeas as mere redundancy-as a means of doublechecking the accuracy of convictions in a federal court, presumably
well-attuned to the substance of federal rights. The redundancy of
habeas, which is frequently challenged as a barrier to finality, is
more than a double-track insurance scheme to promote accuracy.
At a second, more sophisticated level, the vindication of federal
rights by federal courts justifies habeas, given the existence of
doubts as to the interpretation of federal law by state courts, which
06
endure their own local pressures.'
On a third level, which is the territory explored by Cover and
103 Mello, supra note 3.
104 Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE LJ.

1035 (1977).
105 Id. at 1050.

106 Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that state
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Aleinikoff, the redundancy of habeas procedure can be viewed as a
forging ground for rights.' 0 7 The state and federal courts engage in
a dialogue which sharpens the meaning of asserted rights, turning
them into rights recognized and defined.' 0 8 In turn, this dialectical
rights discourse informs the Supreme Court by presenting opinions
offering different reasoned responses to a given post-conviction issue.' 0 9 Under this picture, the dual court systems operate analogously to counsel on appeal-sharpening, refining and abandoning
claims so that the decision-maker has a clear-cut choice which is informed by the "adversarial" context.
Given the importance of this procedure as a rights-defining dialogue, the importance of counsel throughout the post-conviction
process becomes clear. Just as the Supreme Court is aided by the
presence of well-articulated opposition, the lower courts, as they
mould claims for final consideration, depend on the dialectical opposition of counsel. This point is also an institutional point. Given
the importance of the post-conviction system as a crucible of rights,
the quality of legal discourse here is of enormous, case-transcending
import.
The courts and the commentators have been engaged in a
thirty-year battle over the meaning and uses of habeas corpus.'10
That battle has focused on the finality-defying nature of habeas and
the historical basis for using habeas to correct federal constitutional
errors at the post-conviction stage. Bator urged the courts to restrict habeas corpus to federal collateral review of state court process."'I The Brown v. Allen 1 12 model of relitigation of all federal
constitutional claims struck Bator as a wastefully redundant use of
judicial resources.' 1 3 Peller has pointed out in his penetrating discussion of Bator's vision' 14 that the philosophical premise underlying Bator's dislike of relitigation is that absolute certainty-as to
factfinding and the "truth" of a legal rule-is not possible. In Bator's words, "we can never absolutely recreate past phenomena and
thus can never have final certainty as to their existence."' 15 Thus,
court selection process and concomitant majoritarian pressure renders state courts a
less preferable forum for civil liberties limitation).
107 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 1048.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See supra

note 15 and accompanying text.
111 Bator, supra note 15, at 453-54.
112 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
113 Bator, supra note 15, at 451-52.
114 Peller, supra note 15, at 587.
115 Bator, supra note 15, at 447.

1989] FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL? 1081
for Bator, "rights" must be defined as the outcome of adequate institutional processes.'1 6 For this reason, Bator would restrict
habeas to an inquiry by federal courts into the adequacy of state
process.
Peller pointed out that the redundancy problem Bator identified is illusory; if, in fact, the state courts have failed in their task,
there is not redundancy, for the federal courts are then the first
courts to do the job correctly. 1 7 More damaging to the conclusion
Bator drew from his philosophical skepticism is the point Cover and
Aleinikoff make mathematically: The issue is not one of nihilism,
but of prohibility. 18 A second look is not a guarantee of absolute
truth, nor is a seventh look. Redundancy, however, increases the
probability that the ultimate result will be more accurate. Provided
that the post-conviction process is not an arid ritual of patheticpro se
claims which cannot advance the inquiry, Cover and Aleinikoff's
probability study will work.
Bator's adequacy review also depends on the presumption that
state courts will make a strong effort to enforce federal rights. 1 9
Because the Court in Brown v. Allen was not willing to make this assumption, 120 the redundancy technique was a logical consequence.
Bator used the formalistic notion that the supremacy clause and the
structure of federalism must be presumed to be working to deny this
aspect of Brown. In some sense this presumption would prove more
than even Bator suggested: Ought not federalism and supremacy
self-enact on the level of state process as well? If one admits that a
little checking up is necessary on a procedural level, why not on the
substantive plane as well?
Perhaps Bator would reply that facts must be viewed skeptically.
But the possible hostility of local courts to federal rights is no more
fact-based than their institutional processes. The articulation of
federal rights, a textual operation, takes a set of facts as given. For
purposes of legal theory, courts assume facts, facts are conceded,
claims are surrendered along the way. The indeterminacy of truth,
which, if taken to its final Humean limits would render all of law a
little suspicious, is not a pertinent way of limiting the rhetorical
elaboration of rights. Even if three out of five of my criminal activities have been misconstrued-and not even Descartes could convince the court that I "really" was someplace else at the time-the
Id. at 449.
117 Peller, supra note 15, at 589.
118 Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 104, at 1045.
119 Bator, supra note 15, at 510-12.
120 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
116
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process whereby my rights are mapped out upon the surface of
probabilistic reality is not affected. One could argue that the rights
do not really exist if they are articulated upon an indeterminate "reality," but it is doubtful that the legal system is prepared to play so
ghostly a role.
Nor did Bator suggest that the fundamentally doubtful character of fact should prevent punishment. Unless one is so skeptical as
to doubt that an unjust punishment is absolutely happening, because it cannot be the subject of certain proof, the reality of punishment is more determinate than any "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard. But this disparity, which is narrowed by the probabilistic
improvements of redundancy, was not raised by Bator.
The concern for finality which Bator expressed has merged in
the Supreme Court with two other issues: the question of whether
habeas corpus should be available unless a prisoner can make a
"colorable claim of innocence," and the historical issue of whether
habeas was intended to function as the kind of writ of error meant
under Brown v. Allen. The use of habeas as a reagent to test the
"accuracy" of a finding of guilt is not particularly apposite of habeas
claims based on the accuracy of a sentence, and the Court has admitted as much. 12 1 Although the Court has moved toward adopting
the late Judge Henry Friendly's idea 12 2 that the balance between finality and relitigation should tilt to granting the writ where claims
did not receive fair attention in state court or where a "colorable
claim of innocence" exists, 123 the Court's formula, which speaks of
trying to use the writ to prevent "a fundamentally unjust incarceration," could be recast to include a probing review of sentences.
In fact, the history of habeas corpus in America shows that the
justice of sentencing was a traditional use of the writ long before
Brown v. Allen. 124 Although Bator was interested in using the writ
primarily as an institutional check on process, in his own influential
history of habeas he admitted that by 1873 the Court was using
"habeas corpus . . .to reexamine, not substantive errors going to
the conviction, but alleged illegality in the sentence."1 25 Even if Ba26
tor's version of habeas history is correct (which is hotly disputed)1
and the initial American use of the writ was as a "strict jurisdictional
121 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986); id. at 545-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122 Friendly, supra note 15.
123 Id. at 160.
124 Bator, supra note 15, at 471.
125 Id. at 467.
126

Peller, supra note 15, at 610-42.
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test,"' 12 7 he admitted that the "sanctity of a judgment' of conviction
was not ascribed to a sentence because it was felt that the judge's
sentencing function is not judicial' in the same sense as his decision
of the issues bearing on the substantive outcome."1 2 8 Bator disliked
this idea and would not allow modern defendants to "gain comfort"'129 from what he regarded as exceptions to simple jurisdic-

tional review, because he found it "unhistoricial" to decide that the
old "rubrics were meaningful and useful." 3 0 This is actually a curious statement coming from Bator, given the significance he would
attach to the rubric of "jurisdiction." For, as Peller pointed out, the
jurisdictional review of the Supreme Court has altered drastically
since the 19th century.' 3 ' Peller went to some lengths to show that
the 19th century Supreme Court's treatment of habeas cases was
based on "lack of appellate jurisdiction, not a narrow view of the
habeas remedy,"' 1 2 because the Court at that time simply lacked appellate jurisdiction over criminal judgments. The lower federal
courts, which were not so circumscribed, interpreted the writ in
merits terms, not as a purely formal jurisdictional inquiry.
The contemporary Supreme Court, which has narrowed the
federal rights relitigation role of Brown v. Allen, has yet to come to
grips with the historical significance of the sentencing review noted
by Bator. Although the Court has generally adopted Justice Powell's reworking of Bator's historical thesis as a revisionist means of
defining the role of habeas, and of narrowing Fay v. Noia,13 3 the
Court's historicism has yet to achieve a penalty or sentencing dimension. Assuming the Court continues to be convinced by Bator's
history, the Court need not be bound by the categories he uses.
Where Bator finds the review of sentencing to be an "extension" of
the writ, the Court could make the same distinction as the 19th century Court-sentencing is not the kind ofjudicial -act which requires
only a processual review.
The intervention of Judge Friendly's "colorable claim of innocence" into habeas law provides another avenue for the Court to
consider sentencing as an integral part of habeas. The holdings in
Rose v. Mitchell134 and Vasquez v. Hillary,13 5 as they interact with the
127
128

Bator, supra note 15, at 471.
Id.

129 Id. at 472.
130 Id.
131 Peller, supra note 15,
132 Id.
133 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
134 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
135

474 U.S. 254 (1986).

at 611.
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limitations of Stone v. Powell,13 6 suggest that an amalgam of Friendly
and Bator is in the works.1 37 While Stone emphasized the guilt re!ated nature of collateral review, Rose and Hillary re-examined claims
of racial discrimination injury selection which did not affect the determination of guilt.1 38 Peller speculated that the Court seems to be
developing a bifurcated approach to habeas which will amount to
full collateral review of guilt related claims and a selective review of
non-guilt claims amounting to "personal constitutional rights"
rather than 'judicially created remedies." 1 39 Peller was quite right
to suggest that this sort of bifurcation reveals conflicting views of
the "nature of legality"a 4°-for the guilt review method is result ori4
ented, while cases like Rose and Hillary are process oriented.1 '
Whatever the logical inconsistencies of this approach, the question of sentencing review will be central. The issue of the "accuracy" of a death sentence, if presented apart from claims which call
into question the finding of guilt, should be reviewed as a process
oriented claim. This is so because the right to appropriate punishment is a personal constitutional right, not ajudicial remedy such as
the fourth amendment "rights" cut off from review by Stone v. Powell.
It seems from the cases, however, that the view more likely to prevail is that sentencing should be reviewed under the result prong of
the bifurcated habeas scheme. Justice O'Connor, writing for the
Court, and Justice Stevens, in dissent, 14 2 have acknowledged that
the factual innocence inquiry is not apposite to sentencing review.14 3 There is, however, the idea that "innocence" as applied to
sentencing has vitality in the sense that a person given a sentence is
factually innocent if he or she does not merit that particular penalty.
The claim is not that a prisoner is innocent in the sense that he or
she should be set free, but that the sentence is inappropriate. One
federal court of appeal's judge put it this way in dissent:
In the context of death penalty habeas corpus litigation, one may be
guilty of murder and yet not subject to the death penalty. Thus, when
I advocate that a district judge ought to be able to hear a petition
brought by one claiming innocence, I would interpret "innocence,"
where the death penalty is involved as being innocent of any statutory
aggravating circumstance essential to eligibility for the death
136 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
137 Peller, supra note 15, at 602.

Id. at 597.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 602.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 2672-73.
143 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538 (1986).
138
'39
140
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penalty. 144
It is worth remembering in this context that Judge Friendly's
idea of restricting habeas to cases in which colorable claims of innocence exist came at a time when the death penalty was itself moribund. 4 5 The balancing of finality as a virtue in the legal system
against the search for an approximated probabilistic account of the
truth is struck differently when the penalty is death. 146 Death has its
14 7
own finality, and a separate jurisprudence, to be discussed below,
which stresses the need for more than ordinary care in review is
necessary.
The complexity of the Court's bifurcated approach, which
seems to be developing a hierarchy of rightsl 4 8 -some available for
habeas review, others not-leaves current habeas law in a treacherously unpredictable state. As Peller pointed out, the statutory reinterpretation, which has been in progress since Stone, is sub rosasome members of the Court denying that a reinterpretation is in
progress, others decrying it as law and as judicial dishonesty. The
current synthesis of result and process analyses contains a logical
incoherence, perhaps a deep philosophic disagreement about the
"nature of legality,"' 4 9 which is probably as unstable from a predictive standpoint as it is logically. Doctrine, in short, is in metamorphosis. The "legal" question of how to present a claim, how best to
appeal to a court's sense of its duty, is never a simple question.
When doctrine is unstable and possibly undergoing silent revision,
the task is a speculative one even for a professional. 150
Doctrinal answers will be found as the Supreme Court selects
cases already defined by the dialectical process identified by Cover
and Aleinikoff. State and federal courts, struggling with the logical
difficulties inherent in an unresolved tension between process and
factual innocence, between personal rights and judicial remedies,
will clarify the emergence of what may be a revision of the writ by
accretion. The complexity of this process, which took Cover and
Aleinikoff sixty-seven pages to explain, along with the rather rarified
conceptual nature of the distinctions between result and process,
144 Moore v. Kemp, 824 F.2d 847, 878 (11th Cir. 1987)(en banc)(Hill, J., dissenting),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 925 (1988).
145 Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?, 38 U. Ci. L. REV. 142 (1970). Friendly's article
appeared in 1970, during a ten year (1967-77) moratorium on executions in the United
States.
146 Smith, 477 U.S. at 545-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 See infra § VII.
148 Peller, supra note 15, at 599.
149 Id. at 602.

150 Id. at 600-601.
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the definition of what is a right and what is a remedy, and the debate
over the history of habeas, make this area of the law a theoretician's
field day.
Keeping in mind the complexity of habeas law, and also keeping in mind the picture of an isolated, psychologically pressured,
and illiterate, mentally ill retarded death row inmate described in
FacingDeath Alone, the reader is asked to estimate the likelihood that
pro se entrants in this dialectic would be able to hold up their end of
the conversation. The federalist dialectic Cover and Aleinikoff discerned in habeas relitigation-which informs the decision-making of
the Supreme Court-depends, in its turn, on the small scale dialogue between the state and the condemned prisoner. The debate
at the top of this pyramid implicates philosophical concerns about
the nature of legality itself. At the broad base, prisoners concerned
with staying alive present rights claims which are refined, winnowed
and elaborated through two court systems. The ultimate defninition
of our rights, on the rarefied theoretical level, is the result of this
dialogic interaction. Cover and Aleinikoff's response to this was to
stress the importance of keeping the federal courts involved in this
dialogue to ensure its integrity. At the bottom level of the process,
the interaction of pragmatic state courts, micro-managing criminal
justice, and federal courts, representing the idealist strain in American legal history, provide the Supreme Court with well-defined and
actual choices. Thus all of us have a stake in the effective functioning
of a process which defines the rights individuals bear. The state and
federal systems, if they are to contribute to this process, need a technically correct, philosophically informed dialogue between their litigants. Each level needs a pair-6f forceful and prepared participants
capable of recognizing the institutional needs of successful
dialogue.
We are committed, or so the courts often tell us, to the idea that
dialectical processes inform those who make legal choices for us.
The adversarial process is the local level of this creed. The federalist dialectic is the local/national level of it. At the federal level, the
separation of powers produces a similar, often bitterly fought, interchange. While not forgetting the personal importance of counsel
to the condemned, the purpose here is to argue that good lawyers
are essential to the process itself. It is a complex area of the law, but
also one which means a great deal to all of us as rights bearers. The
legal system itself needs a vital and intelligent institutional framework for the definition of habeas corpus. Lawyers are essential to
the quality of the adversarial dialectic. Judicial self-respect should
be enough to require counsel at every conversational step, state or
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federal, because the courts have an obligation to themselves that
their information, the kinds of arguments they hear, and the implications of a given decision, are presented competently. In dissent in
Betts v. Brady, Justice Black cited to the Indiana Supreme Court of
1854, for the proposition that:
It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that
any citizen put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of
counsel because he was too poor to employ such aid. No Court should
be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The defense
of the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere, which will be at
once conceded as essential to the accused, to the Court, and to the
public.'l5
The more abstract level at which post-conviction law works to
define general principles is less humanly moving than the spectacle
of a single life lost because of lack of counsel. But the institutional
duty remains to ensure an informed process, beyond the kangaroo
trial court indecency Justice Black loathed. For the flaws of dialogue
left by inadequate argument come back to condemn other individuals, as yet unknown, whose lives depend on how well their rights are
defined today.
"
*V. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
GIDEON V WAINIWRIGHT AND DOUGLAS m CALIFORNIA

The second constituent underlying the right to counsel for the
condemned in post-conviction proceedings is the right to counsel at
felony trials and on the first non-discretionary appeal, found in
Gideon v. Wainwright 152 and Douglas v. California.15 3 In a happier day,
these cases would have been extended long ago to cover all aspects
of the death penalty process from arrest to cemetery. They have not
been used for this purpose in non-capital cases, but even this limitation has been achieved"only through a stingy reading of precedent.
It is a time honored device of legal reasoning to show how a
case can be gutted by a narrow reading. 5 4 Oftentimes, this consists
of limiting a case to its facts or to the minima of its rationale. 15 5
This technique, which implies covert disapproval of a case, can be
used honestly, although there are no rules which say it must be. To
use a precedent or to limit it offers courts a way to rewrite history.
151 316 U.S. 455, 476-77 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind.

13, 18 (1848)).

152 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
153 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
154 See Kennedy, Legal Education as Trainingfor Hierarchy, in THE POLrTCS OF LAW 40,

45 (D. Kairys, ed. 1982).
155 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 99, at 87.
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The first step is to maul a case by restating it. This can be seen as a
necessary lubricant allowing the law to free itself gradually from odious disjecta membra of its past.
Whatever the advantages of this technique may be, the GideonDouglas line of cases has been subjected to it in an extraordinary
way. The prestige of Gideon is such that only judicial tartuffery has
been available to the Court. The result has been bad law in a sense
having nothing to do with one's view of the results as outcomes. It is
bad law considered from the loftiest peaks of neutrality and
indifference.
Gideon is deservedly famous for its guarantee of the right to
counsel in state trial felony courts, as well as for its forthright repudiation of Betts v. Brady 15 6 (reflecting a personal triumph for Justice
Black and judicial honesty). The case needs its background or it is a
157
faceless rule in a vacuum.
Powell v. Alabama 158 had established the right to counsel in capital trials thirty years previously. It is no accident that Powell v. Alabama, the first case to interpret the federal Constitution to guarantee
the right to counsel in state felony trials, was a capital case. To be
sure, Powell did not explicitly create a right to counsel in all capital
cases. Only in those capital cases in which the defendant was incapable of making his own defense-because, for example, of ignorance or illiteracy-was a defendant entitled to counsel. But even
during the regime of the Betts v. Brady 159 "special circumstances"
test, the right to counsel was deemed absolute in capital cases. The
Court noted in 1961 that "[w]hen one pleads guilty to a capital
charge without benefit of counsel, we do not stop to determine
160
whether prejudice resulted."
16
In the principal brief for petitioner in Gideon v. Wainwright, 1
Clarence Earl Gideon argued-through counsel-that the distinction between capital and non-capital felony cases could not be defended. Counsel was indispensable in both.' 6 2 The Court implicitly
agreed, overruling Betts v. Brady. Justice Harlan, concurring, noted
that "[t]he special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned
in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should be simi156 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
157 See A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964).
158 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
159 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
160 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); see also Uvegers V. Pennsylvania, 335
U.S. 437, 441 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948).
161 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
162 Brief for Petitioner at 43-44, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 335 (1963).

1989] FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL? 1089
larly abandoned in non-capital cases, at least as to offenses which, as
the one involved here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison
16 3
sentence."
In Gideon, Justice Black did more than incorporate Powell by reference-he quoted it at length.1 64 In so doing, he brought Justice
Sutherland's rhetoric back as part of his analysis of the "fundamental" character of the right to counsel. The fundamental status of the
federal guarantee overcame Betts v. Brady under the logic of Palko v.
Connecticut:16 5 If the right is fundamental to "ordered liberty" under
Palko, it applies to the states via the fourteenth amendment.' 66 The
Court, however, was not content to label the guarantee as fundamental and cryptically incorporate it that way. Gideon reasoned to find
out why the right to counsel "in all criminal prosecutions" is fundamenta.16 7 These reasons offer no basis for supposing that trial is
different from appeal or post-conviction.
Gideon stated that the right is fundamental because of the adversarial process.16 8 The fact is that governments make sure that their
side is represented by the best lawyers they can obtain. 16 9 Furthermore, defendants hire lawyers whenever they can: "That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the
money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries."' 170 The opinion then quoted from Powell at length:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent
and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science
of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of17conviction
because
1
he does not know how to establish his innocence.
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 344-45.
302 U.S. 319, 324-26 (1937).
Id. at 324-25, 326.
Id. at 339, 341-45.
372 U.S. at 344.

Id.
Id.

171 344 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
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The Court in Betts v. Brady analyzed the issue as did Justice
Black later in Gideon. The question in both cases was whether the
presence of counsel was "so fundamental and essential to a fair trial,
to due process of law, that it is made obligatory upon the states by
the fourteenth amendment."1 7 2 The Court in Betts refused to find
counsel required for all cases, because the "totality of facts in a
given case" might not always demand counsel.1 7 3 The sliding scale
approach of Betts, later condemned in Gideon, could be harmonized
with the holding of Powell by distinguishing Powell as a capital case,
that is, by taking the possibility of execution as part of the "totality"
of the case in determining whether the absence of counsel would be
"shocking to the universal sense ofjustice."' 174
Gideon decided that it shocks the fundamental sense ofjustice to
let a defendant go into a felony trial without a lawyer.' 7 5 The excerpt from Powell, and the Court's recognition of the adversarial
76
context, form the heart of the ratio decedendi of Gideon.1
This analysis has two separate prongs. The first is the recognition that it is unfair to pit lay people against lawyers whom the state
will invariably deploy on its behalf. The second is linked but shaded
differently, taken out of the adversarial context to stand alone: The
law is simply too complex to expect that a layperson could succeed
even with what ought to be a successful claim. It follows that the
nature of the legal process frustrates a pro se effort-an adversarial
presentation of technically abstruse argument will frustrate the "noble ideal" of a fair trial, "if the poor man charged with crime has to
77
face his accusers without a lawyer."'
Powell and Gideon dealt with trials, but they cannot fairly be so
limited. Part of the reason for this comes from Douglas, but the true
reason should be clear-the adversarial and technical law should
not be available only to one side. Each stage of a "criminal prosecution '" 17 8 contains these elements. The reasons for concern which lie

behind Gideon do not evaporate after trial. The Court does not pretend that they do.
One could restate Gideon narrowly, as standing for the proposi172 Belts, 316

173

Id. at

174

Id.

U.S. at 465.

462.

175 This is a way to fit Gideon in under Belts, which allows for an evolving standard of

legal decency.
176 The only other task Black faced was incorporation under Palko. Gideon, 372 U.S. at
342.
177 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
178 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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tion that states (and the federal courts) 17 9 must furnish counsel at

trial in felony cases. There is a reassuring black letter familiarity to
that sort of treatment. It is no canard, however, to say that the rule
of Gideon ought not be divorced from its logic, which is, after all, that
lawyers are so important to due process that poor people ought to
get them too. To this the riposte is doubtless true-at trial, because
that is what "criminal prosecution" means in the sixth amendment.
To explore this idea it is necessary to turn to Douglas v. Califort
80
nia.
In Douglas, petitioners had been denied court appointed
counsel for their appeals as of right because the state appellate court
...
J81
justice
Douglas,
belived it would do "no good whatever..
writing for the Supreme Court, agreed with Justice Traynor of the
California Supreme Court that denial of counsel on appeal was "a
discrimination at least as invidious as that condemned in Griffin v.
Illinois.... " 1 82 The right to counsel was thus brought under the
wing of Grjfin, which Douglas restated in this way:
In Griffin v. Illinois, we held that a State may not grant appellate review
in such a way as to discriminate against some convicted defendants on
account of their poverty. Their... right to a free transcript on appeal
was in issue. Here the issue is whether or not an indigent shall be
denied the assistance of counsel on appeal. In either case the evil is
the same: discrimination against the indigent. For there can be no
appeal a man enjoys "depends on
equal justice where the kind of18an
3
the amount of money he has."
The Court thus defined a Griffin situation as one in which the
state may not "grant appellate review in such a way as to discriminate
18 4
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.
The Court was reading Griffin and holding in Douglas that an appeal
when granted-again,once it is in place as a procedure-may not operate to discriminate against the indigent.
Douglas guaranteed counsel'for the first appeal as of right, which
was the situation before the Court.' 8 5 The opinion expressly denied
that it was deciding the rule for discretionary appeals. 18 6 The contemplated threshold for future cases was said to be that "differences" may exist "so long as the result does not amount to a denial
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 296 (1938).
180 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
181 Id. at 355.
182 Id. (quoting People v. Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 71, 357 P.2d 1072, 1076, 9 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1955) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
183 Id. at 355 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. at 19).
184 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
185 372 U.S. at 356.
186 Id.
179
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of due process or an invidious discrimination." 187 This open-ended
formulation was not all, for the Court went on to say that
"[a]bsolute equality is not required: lines can be and are drawn and
we often sustain them."' 188 But "where the merits of the one and
only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit
of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor."' 18 9 At issue was whether the rich person
could "require the court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor [person] cannot."' 90 This violates
equal protection, the "equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment."191
The opinion in Douglas suggests that the real standard to be applied is whether "[t]he indigent... has only the right to a meaning19 2
less ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal."'
Underlying the obvious equal protection implications of the standard is the ominous use of "right" in "right to a meaningless ritual." In a rhetorical context, the use of "right" is clearly ironic.
There is room however, to distinguish between a "right" and a
"grant," in the sense in which "grant" is used in Griffin. For there is
more than a hint in Giffin-and in the Douglas exposition of Griffinthat granted appeals have the power to "bootstrap" the state into
due process. If this is so, the Douglas limitation on appeals "as of
right" is a mere fortuity of caselaw development, and the crucial
item of the analysis becomes the question of whether "invidious discrimination" degrades granted appeals into "meaningless ritual." To
discover this requires examination of Griffin itself.
Griffin v. Illinois193 dates from 1956 and thus predates Gideon. At
that time, Illinois required payment of a fee to obtain a transcript of
one's trial. Having a transcript was necessary to obtain appeal on a
writ of error, since "to get full direct appellate review of alleged
errors by a writ of error it is necessary for the defendant to furnish
the appellate court with a bill of exceptions."1 94 Illinois law defined
writs of error as appeals of right. 195
Counsel for the state conceded that petitioners needed their
188

Id.
Id. at 357.

189

Id.

187

190 Id.

191 Id. at 358
192 Id.
193 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
194 Id. at 13.
195 Id.
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transcripts "in order to get adequate appellate review."' 19 6 Therefore, the due process/equal protection claim was squarely before
the Court. Despite the historical fact that appeals are not required
by the federal Constitution, the Court found "no meaningful distinction" between trial, perse, and appellate review. Once the states
impose appeals on themselves, they cannot go back on their pledge
to provide a fair hearing: "Consequently, at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect persons . .. from invidious discriminations."1 9 7 Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence, although stressing the idea that absolute equality
ought not be the expectation, was equally clear on the point that
self-imposed processes do trigger a fourteenth amendment analysis. 198 If the state has a "general policy of allowing criminal appeals,
it cannot make lack of means an effective bar to the exercise of this
opportunity. The State cannot keep the word of promise to the ear
of those illegally convicted and break it to their hope."' 199
Thus the stage of a proceeding, even the non-required nature of
a proceeding, binds the "grantor" of a right, since even created
rights (if there is any other kind of right)20 0 generate reciprocal obligations. The Court has not, however, so held. In a series of noncapital cases, the Court drew the line at the first appeal as of right.
The Court in Ross v. Mofitt 2 0 1 refused to extend Douglas to discretionary review beyond the first plenary appeal. Following Mofitt,
the Court in Wainwright v. Torna 20 2 rejected a state prisoner's claim
that'he had been denied effective assistance of counsel when his appellate attorney filed an untimely application for certiorari in the
Florida Supreme Court, which that court refused to entertain. The
United States Supreme Court, relying on Moffitt, found that Torna
did not possess a "constitutional right to counsel" in efforts to obtain such discretionary review and concluded that "since Toma had
no constitutional right to counsel, he could not be deprived of the
effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file
20 3
the application timely."
In Pennsylvania v. Finley,2 04 the Court applied Moffitt to hold that
at 16.
at 18 (emphasis added).
198 Id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 24.
200 Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) with H.
196 Id.
197 Id.

LAW
201
202
203
204

(1961).

417 U.S. 600 (1974).
455 U.S. 586 (1982).
Id. at 587-88.
107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987).
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there is no right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings:
[W]e have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to
counsel when mounting collateral attacks to their convictions and we
decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.
Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we establish a right to counsel
on discretionary appeals. We think that since a defendant has no federal constitutional right to counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right
when attacking a conviction that has
long since become final upon ex20 5
haustion of the appellate process.
The Court reasoned that "post-conviction relief is even further
removed from the criminal trial than is discretionary direct review.
It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered civil in nature. '20 6 It is a "collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant has failed to secure relief through
direct review of his conviction. States have no obligation to provide
this avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness
mandated by the Due Process clause does not require that the State
20 7
supply a lawyer as well."

The actual holding of Finley is most relevant to the inquiry here.
But because Finley was based almost entirely on Moffitt, a focus on
Moffitt is necessary. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a majority
of the Court in Moffitt, restated Douglas v. California as follows:
"[Douglas] held that the State must.., provide counsel for the indigent on his first appeal as of right." 20 8 After describing the history
of the case, Rhenquist quoted from the Douglas opinion as it left
open the right to counsel at subsequent stages of appeal. To leave
Douglas or Griffin open to restatement, the Moffitt Court said that
"[t]he precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas line of cases has
never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the
Equal Protection Clause . . . and some from the Due Process

Clause." 20 9 Moffitt concluded that "[n]either clause by itself proId. at 1993 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1994.
Id. (citations omitted). Moffitt, Torna and Finley were non-capital cases. One district court and a student commentator have powerfully distinguished Moffitt from capital
cases on that basis. Note, Due Process in State Capital Cases: The Right to Counselfor Indigent
Defendants Beyond the InitialAppeal As of Right, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 61, 79-80
(1978). District Judge McMillan wrote that "[wihere a man's life is at stake, I am not
prepared to concede that the law in Moffitt, the case of a small time forger, should apply." Carey v. Garrison, 403 F. Supp. 395, 397 (W.D.N.C. 1975). See also In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 447 P.2d 117, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21 (Cal. 1968) (pre-Moffitt case
requiring counsel for certiorari petition in capital case).
208 417 U.S. at 607.
209 Id. at 608-9.
205
206
207
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vides an entirely satisfactory basis for the result reached." 21 0 The
Moffitt opinion then addressed the bases of decision in those cases
by using the dissent Justice Harlan wrote in Douglas, without looking
to the majority opinion to see whether the "rationale" was "explicitly stated" or not. 2 11 Noting that "[t]he Court in Douglas stated that
[w]hen an indigent is forced to run this gauntlet of a preliminary
showing of merit, the right to appeal does not comport with fair
procedure' " 2 12 -a sentiment lacking explicitness only in that it
avoids a ritualistic incantation of quoting the fourteenth amendment. The Moffitt opinion then stated that Justice Harlan, in dissent,
thought that the "due process issue.., was the only one worthy of
2 13
extended consideration.Having infiltrated the dissent-the losing side of the Court's majority-to sidestep the equal protection side of the opinion of the
Court in Douglas, the only remaining leg of Douglas was due process.
Due process was the only aspect of Douglas that the Moffitt Court
wanted to talk about, and the fact that the dissent in Douglas wanted
to eliminate equal protection allowed the Court to glide lightly past
half the rationale of Douglas.214 When the Moffitt opinion did discuss
equal protection, it was only to say that many cases have indicated
that "simple equality," to use Walzer's phrase, 2 15 is not what the
clause is all about.
There are reasons for reading Moffitt narrowly which transcend
one's sympathy for the victims of its logic. First, Moffitt was itself a
piece of subterfuge. It read the due process and equal protection
rationales of Douglas through the dissent, and without a meaningful
discussion of the ratio decedendi of the majority opinion. Second,
Moffitt posed an arbitrary boundary to extension of Douglas which
was in no way founded on anything which decided Douglas. Third,
the equal protection argument in Moffitt said only that that clause
does not impose a regime of simple equality, but offered no intelligible basis for not trying to infuse some content into the clause.
Fourth, the holding in Moffitt spoke of applying equal protection in
degrees, but the Court did so using the wrong sliding scale. The
degree to be used ought to be the risk to which a defendant or inmate is exposed, rather than where he or she is on the criminal law's
assembly line.
210
211
212
213
214
215

Id. at 609.
Id.
Id. (quoting Douglas, 372 U.S. 353, 357).
Id. at 609-10.
Id.
M.WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 14-26 (1983).
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Fifth, the argument that counsel is not required on discretionary appeal is a flight from reality. State courts, the Court said in
Moffitt, have no obligation to provide any appeals; therefore no
counsel can be required. This proves too much, becuase other protections are offered on discretionary appeals. It also shows nothing.
The historical moment has long since passed when it would have
been intelligible to refuse appeals altogether. The system as is offers the promise ofjustice to appellants and petitioners; somewhere
along the way a decision was made by our legal culture to safeguard
the process and its potential victims. The optional quality of that
decision is today no more up for grabs than the use of a net in
tennis.
However, that is also not what Gideon, Douglas and Griffin were
about. As discussed above, those cases recognized functional limits
to legal equality, but stressed the need to prevent a one-sided "gladiators versus the martyrs" sanction for indigent prisoners interested
in exercising their rights.
Death row prisoners are almost always indigent. Given the typically commercial nature of the law, American courts have noticed
that economic disparities can affect the outcome of cases in ways not
easily reduced to judicial formulae. Noticing this fact has not necessarily translated into reality-the equal protection clause has never
2 16
been pressed into service as guarantor of "majestic equality."
Noble language has decorated pragmatic minima when the alternative would be a radical critique of an entire order in which justice is
a saleable commodity.
The opinions in Douglas and Gideon were grounded in their rhetoric. There is no suggestion in either case that the rules they announce are limited by the procedural stage of the cases.
VI.

AcCESs To THE COURTS

The third prong of the complex right to capital post-conviction
counsel is the Court's access to courts'jurisprudence. The principal
cases here, Johnson v. Avery 2 17 and Bounds v. Smith, 2 18 are based on
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Both cases
dealt with the non-capital post-conviction process.
The Court in Johnson recognized that to require prisoners to
fend for themselves in the post-conviction process is "ineffect" to
216 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
217 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
218 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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deny them access to the judicial system.2 1 9 In Johnson the dispute
was over access to jailhouse lawyers, for example, prisoners who assist other inmates in pressing their appeals. The State of Tennessee
discouraged such assistance by removing jailhouse lawyers from the
general prison population. 220 The Supreme Court found Tennes22
see's actions unconstitutional. '
Since the general prison population includes among its number
"a high percentage of persons who are totally or functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose intelligence is limited," 22 2 the Court concluded that "for all practical
purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of ajailhouse
lawyer,' their possibly valid constitutional claims will never be heard
in any court." 2 23 In "the case of all except those who are able to
help themselves-usually a few old hands or exceptionally gifted
prisoners-the prisoner is, in effect, denied access to the courts un224
less such help is available."
Bounds v. Smith 2 25 expanded the fundamental constitutional
right of access to courts. In Bounds, the Court held that adequate
prison law libraries are one constitutionally accepted way of insuring
meaningful access to the judicial system. The alternative is to provide adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. The
Court noted that its decision inJohnson v. Avery "did not attempt to
set forth the full breadth of the right of access," 2 26 and that "the
cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total
22 7
denial."
The complexity of the post-conviction process was the main focus of the Bounds opinion. "It would verge on incompetence for a
lawyer to file an initial pleading without researching" 2 28 the many
issues that inevitably arise when filing an appellate brief or postconviction pleading. "If a lawyer must perform such preliminary research, it is no less vital for a 'pro se' prisoner." 2 29 Indeed, "it is
often more important that a prisoner complaint set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural prerequisites, since the court may
219 Johnson, 393 U.S. at 487.
220 Id. at 484.
221 Id. at 489-90.
222 393 U.S. at 487.
223 Id. (quotingJohnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 779, 784 (1968)).
224 Id. at 488.
225 430 U.S. 817 (1977)

226 430 U.S. at 824.
at 825.
228 Id. at 825.
227 Id.

229 Id. at 825-26.
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pass on the complaint's sufficiency before allowing filing 'in forma
230
pauperis' and may dismiss the case if it is deemed frivolous.
Even the most dedicated trial judges are bound to overlook meritorious cases without the benefit of an adversary presentation.
Notably, neitherJohnson nor Bounds depended on the "of right"
appeal stage made much of in Ross v. Moffitt-although neither did
the cases misinterpreted in Moffitt. The rhetorical stance of Johnson
and Bounds was quite different from the due process/equal protection language which the Moffitt Court found insufficiently explicit in
Douglas. For this reason, the meaningful access cases, while less lyrical than those cases in which Supreme Court Justices sang the
praises of lawyers in general, do inject a whiff of reality into the picture ofpro se living. The opinion in Johnson was based on the effective
denial of access to prisoners who are in reality incapable of taking
advantage of what the law has "promised to their ears."
Johnson was a habeas corpus case, 23 1 and Bounds was a civil rights
case 23 2 claiming an access to courts right. The Court's opinions relied on a logic similar to that of Douglas or Griffin in that the mere
existence of the procedural avenue was used as the basis for the access
right. 23 3 As with the existence of appeal in Griffin, the "is" of
habeas, and the Court's recognized obligation to "maintain it
unimpaired,- 23 4 lead to the realization that "it is fundamental that
access of prisoners... may not be denied or obstructed."' 23 5 TheJohnson opinion was adamant and generous in this respect-the entirety
23 6
of post-conviction proceedings "must be more than a formality."
Furthermore, Johnson made a crucial point about access which
implied an equal protection basis: "[T]here can be no doubt that
Tennessee could not constitutionally adopt and enforce a rule forbidding illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus
petitions." 2 37 But the rule barring assistance by other prisoners "effectively does just that." 23 8 There is a link here to the Griffin sentiment that procedures carry with them an obligation to make sure
that they actually fulfill the function for which they were established.
Johnson found that the effective denial of a procedural opportunity is
230 Id. at 826.
231 In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court extendedJohnson to prison-

ers seeking relief under civil rights statutes.
232 Bounds fell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1986).
233 Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485-86.
234 Id. at 485 (quoting Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939)).
235 Id. (emphasis added).
236 Id. at 486.
237 Id. at 487.
238 Id.
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only trivially different from an outright denial. If the procedure is
constitutionally endorsed (as in a habeas case) the state cannot deny
the means of implementation. If the procedure is self-imposed, obligations are genuine ones.
Lodging the "moral" issue under the rubric of "access" strikes
at the heart of "legalism" as a political theory. 23 9 But the literature
of jurisprudence is replete with recognition of the internal constraints of a commitment to the rule of law. 24 0 This phrase-"the
rule of law"-frequently comes across sounding like little more than
a Sunday school concept with no hard applicability to the "reality"
of deciding cases. Further, in some sense, the phrase is difficult to
provide with a content. Fuller and otherjurisprudes concerned with
the minimal requirements necessary to say that a given society has a
legal system at all have looked, however, to the internal constraints-Fuller used the expression "inner morality of law" 24 1 which force self-respecting legal systems to use the procedures they
hold out to their citizens.
On the most fundamental level, "access" is a procedural "offer" to prisoners. Without it-and without safeguards to make access more than a "meaningless ritual"-the rest of the hopes
anticipated by having a "justice system" are insultingly out of reach.
The rest of one's rights are meaningless unless access is meaningful.
It is therefore a jurisprudential error to suppose that the access
cases can be dealt with in a narrow way, as was done with Douglas,
because their logical basis and linguistic emphasis on reality-based
effectiveness of access are not fact bound holdings which can be limited to accidental caselaw accretions. The holdings of Johnson and
Bounds are not based on "rules" of the black letter variety. They are
premised on a jurisprudential fundamental which defines the parameters of "legality" as part of our political theory. To ignore the
ratio decedendi of these cases would be to make no law in the sense
that a betrayal of their concerns would be a betrayal of the concept
of law and, in a basic sense, lawless.
VII.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE IDEA
THAT DEATH

Is

DIFFERENT

The final element of the right to counsel at all stages of a capital
case is the uniqueness of the death penalty. 2 42 The Supreme Court
239 See Shklar, Legalism, in LAW AND MORALS (1986).
240 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1934).
241 Id.
242 See generally C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2d

Dies, 129 U.

PA. L. REV. 1 (1980).

ed. 1981); Gillers, Deciding Who
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recognized this qualitive difference even in the early modem era of
constitutional criminal procedure. Powell v. Alabama guaranteed lawyers for capital trials, while Betts left non-capital cases open to a sliding scale of necessity. The Court's modern death penalty
jurisprudence stresses the need for "a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed." 24 3 In restating the modern
penalty, the Court has emphasized that it is "profoundly different
'244
from all other penalties.
This sentiment depends on the finality of death. A prison term
can be modified as time passes-there are the possibilities of probation, parole and post-conviction remedies into the far future. 24 5 It is
also grounded on the unique severity of death as a punishment-the
immense gravity of the decision. 246 The powerful condemnatory
purpose of death, which makes a capital punishment "unique... in
its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of
criminal justice," 247 removes death from the usual calculus of punishment. Death penalty law, as it has developed since Furman, is a
response to this perception. The requirements of the Court's modem capital jurisprudence reflect the need to increase the accuracy of
general criminal procedure when death is the possible outcome.
The concern for accuracy and the seriousness of the punishment are
factors that have made the capital post-conviction process so complex that a pro se prisoner cannot be expected to handle it without
assistance of counsel.
This Article has been emphasizing the tension between the procedures which are held out to prisoners and the reality of pro se use
of those procedures. The generalities of modern death penalty jurisprudence, with their emphasis on the need for reliability, are undermined by the growing shortage of lawyers willing or able to take
death cases. 248 However, this simple picture of straight-forward systemic breakdown has been complicated by the Court's seeming tendency to grow impatient with the efforts of death row lawyers. 24 9
The Court's opinion in Barefoot v. Estelle250 reflects this tendency.
Barefoot allows federal appellate courts to compress stay of execution
applications into proceedings on the merits of the habeas corpus
petition and, therefore, to greatly expedite consideration of capital
243 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
244 Id. at 605.
245 Id.
246 Woodson v.

North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
247 Furman, 408 U.S. 238, 306, (Stewart, J., concurring).
248 Mello, supra note 3, at 567-85.
249 Amsterdam, In Favorem Mortis, 14 HuMAN RIGHTS 13 (1987).
250 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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post-conviction cases. The Barefoot Court upheld the expedited procedures adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
25
Circuit. '
But Barefoot is more complicated than that. Barefoot diminished
the effect of the rhetoric and procedural hedges based on the need
for heightened reliability in death cases. Yet a Barefoot rule-the
kind of rule which collapses separate proceedings into a single
event-increases the need for counsel. The Court's Barefoot opinion
itself behaved as if counsel was a predicate to upholding a Barefootstyle procedure.
The Fifth Circuit's procedure was upheld precisely because that
court had an adequate hearing on the merits. "Although the Court
of Appeals moved swiftly to deny the stay, this does not mean that
its treatment of the merits was cursory or inadequate. On the contrary, the court's resolution of the primary issue on appeal, the admission of psychiatric testimony on dangerousness, reflects careful
2 52
consideration."
The Supreme Court went on to say that it would uphold "expedited procedures" only under certain conditions, one of which is
that "counsel has adequate opportunity to address the merits and
knows that he is expected to do so. If appropriate notice is provided, argument on the merits may be heard at the same time
....
"253 At the hearing in Barefoot, "petitioner's attorney was allowed
unlimited time to discuss any matter germane to the case." 2 54 After
their adverse district court ruling, Barefoot's counsel had "71 days to
prepare the briefs and arguments" for presentation to the Fifth Circuit. 25 5 When the circuit court ruled, it specifically mentioned that
"petitioneris represented here, as he has been throughout the habeas corpus
proceedings in state andfederal courts, by a competent attorney experienced in
'25 6
this area of the law."
Thus, although Barefoot reflects an unfortunate lessening of the
general need for accuracy and thorough procedure in capital cases,
251 Id. at 887. As a gesture of judicial impatience with the death bar (unfortunately
harming its clients more than the advocates), Barefoot has been roundly condemned.
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it is implicit in the case that expedited procedure cannot be fair
without counsel. The obligation to provide counsel increases with
the advent of Barefoot rules.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The lines of doctrine and philosophy discussed in this Article
ought to have implications. The thrust of case rhetoric, and the judicially protected "space" mapped out by the cases, begs for a conclusion recognizing the right to counsel throughout the processany process-in which a person is put at risk inside an adversarially
constructed system in which the state marshalls its legal resources to
take the life of a citizen.
The rhetoric and holding of a case like Griffin or Douglas is unmistakeable, despite the obvious and easy facts of decision. The decisions-thought of in terms of outcomes-stop short of the
guarantee supported here. The "true" meaning of the cases is not
as clear as the outcomes, and the business of telling a court that it is
bound in any significant way by the thrust or jurisprudential energy
of a precedent is admittedly tricky and not self-evident. This is so
because the nature of appellate decision-making is designedly deliberate, incremental and timid; the grounds of appellate decision are
fluid, and nothing is predetermined or dictated by precedent not on
all fours. The move to recognizing a general right to counsel,
although it would be an easy, comfortable, incremental judicial
move, still is not a "finding the law" maneuver. The extension of
the cases would be a classic casebook piece of logic, hardly a revolutionary maneuver, less of a leap forward than Furman was, less than
Gideon--Gideon, which required, after all, converting a dissent byJustice Black into a holding by Justice Black, flatly repudiating Betts v.
Brady.
It would be neither complex nor daring to knit together these
cases into the proposition that a right to counsel in capital postconviction proceedings is constitutionally required. The only judicial act of any subtlety, and that marginal, would be distinguishing
Ross v. Mofitt and Pennsylvania v. Finley, for which task the "death is
different" jurisprudence beginning with Furman would do nicely.
The entire post-conviction apparatus and the logic of Douglas converge at this point. Very little new law would need to be written.
The result would not be suprising. In fact, refusing to reach the
result would be an implicit devaluation of each line of case law discussed. It would mean-in effect but also in linguistic terms-that
the rationale of each line of cases had no weight. The force of the
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language in Gideon, Douglas, Griffin, or Powell is one thing. Moffitt suggests the Court's willingness to cut off holdings from their rhetorical
balist: "Our cases say this, but they go no further." That is a device
of restatement, a device that Llewelyn fingered long ago-to restate
the holding of a precedent is to capture its meaning. 25 7 "In Douglas
we decided" could be followed by an infinity of subtle shavings of
reinterpretation. This fluidity of definition is the lawyer's age-old
art. Control is exercised today by the excision of meaning from the
signs of decision, rather than by repudiating the case.
Thus, the Court is "not bound" by the rhetoric of Griffin or Powell-only by the closest, tiniest, cheapest, meanest version of what
went on in those cases. They are at a discount. This would be easy
to do for a Court which had ceased to take its own signs seriously.
There is an implicit nihilism, or at least an ahistorical radicalism, to
the technic of Ross v. Moffitt.
When a court ignores the resonance of its precedents, it deflates the significance of its own work. In a way the power of the
Court resides in the stability of its rhetoric. The Court has fewer
troops than the pope, and in the subtle incorporation of precedential language over time resides the Court's authority. Thus, the
"scheme of ordered liberty" is no tinkertoym-it resonates in a legal
mind and calls up not only Palko v. Connecticut and its facts, but also
the febrile, luminous vision of Justice Cardozo, as if to say-here, I
link this Court and this opinion to Cardozo, to the respect that we
have for him, to the uses to which this phrase from the 1930's have
been put over a half century of earnest effort to hammer out the
meaning of ordered liberty in a hundred new contexts.
As more and more condemned people need lawyers and would
like to have them to save their lives, the theoretical issue of constitutional law takes on a heightened significance. Bernard Williams has
suggested that emergencies trigger a heightened ethical responsibility or obligation. 25 8 That is, the pressure of facts and the shortness
of time can exact a higher degree of responsibility from the actor.
The converse of this idea is that the failure to respond when the
chips are down is a more vicious failure. The crisis on death row
today is an occasion during which the moral fiber of a court is tested
by the development of fact-the decision to require counsel for an
increasing population at an accelerating risk of extinction would be
a moral response fitting the crisis itself. Denial of the right would be
a signal of failure in the face of heightened risk. It would grease the
257 K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 99, at 77-91.
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skids. It would not be a neutral disposition of a nice theoretical
question.
The risk of course varies in intensity, and priorities will be
needed given limits on resources. The risk of execution-final and
irrevocable death-triggers a conclusive finding of emergency. No
greater risk is available in our legal world. Nowhere is a mistake
more profound. At the same time, the state, scenting blood and
subject to a panopoly of external pressures, deploys its finest to secure a death. To restate plainly: The state sends its lawyers to seek
the death of a person. It does so through the avenue it has imposed
on itself-the adversarial process. Trial is adversarial. So is direct
appeal, so is state post-conviction, and so is federal habeas corpus.
The posture changes, but posture is an intermural concete of legalism, meaningless to laypeople, worthless to the person whose life is
at risk.
More compelling than this, however, is the fact that later stages
of the process move the condemned person closer to death.
Anthony Amsterdam's lambent metaphor of the assembly line is
apt:2 59 The finished product is a dead person, but each step in the
process from arrest to the cemetary is equally necessary to the final
product. No stage is without its risk to the condemned. The state
knows this; it sends its gladiators to fight in each round; one would
like to see what would happen to state officials who neglected to do
so. What point, then, can there be in treating the early stages of the
assembly differently from the final touches?

259 Amsterdam, I Favoreni Morris, supra note 147, at 50.

